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Organizing for Impact: International Organizations and Global Pension Policy 
 
Martin Heneghan and Mitchell A Orenstein 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The internal dynamics and politics of international organizations influence how international 
policy agendas are set and how effectively they are pursued. International organizations are 
open systems which respond and adapt to the external policy environment in order to remain 
relevant to global policymaking. Through an analysis of the internal politics of the World Bank 
and International Labour Organization, the leading global agenda-setters for pension reform, 
this article shows that internal political battles and restructuring have a decisive influence on 
global pensions policy. Appointment of key personnel and internal reorganization can help 
make certain policy ideas prominent over others. Scholars should pay greater attention to 
processes of change within international organizations in order to better understand the 
international agenda setting process. 
 
Introduction 
 
During the 1990s, the World Bank positioned itself as the dominant global actor in pension 
policy. It led a coalition of transnational actors in a campaign to persuade countries to partially 
privatize their public pension systems.1 Drawing on reform experiences in Latin America, it 
was successful in convincing a number of countries, particularly in Central and Eastern 
Europe, to carve out a private pension pillar from their public systems (Müller, 1999; Madrid, 
2003; Brooks, 2005; Weyland, 2005; Orenstein, 2008). This entailed diverting funds from the 
public pension system into individually funded accounts. Following the publication in 1994 of 
its seminal document on pension systems, Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the 
Old and Promote Growth, (Averting hereafter), official publications from the Bank promoted 
an almost uniform message on the virtues of a multi-pillar pension system (Beattie and 
McGillivray, 1995; Orenstein, 2008). The success of the campaign was in no small part down 
to this internal coherency and ideological consistency that came out of the Bank for a decade 
following. However, in many countries, these reforms were short-lived. At the onset of the 
global economic crisis, most countries that had adopted pension privatization reforms either 
halted them, drastically reduced the private element, or completely abandoned them (Arza, 
2012; Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012; Orenstein, 2013; Naczyk and Domonkos, 2016; 
Sokhey, 2017). These events signaled a retreat by the World Bank in its promotion of the 
partial privatization of public pension pillars and damaged its reputation in pensions 
expertise.  
 
The World Bank-led campaign had met with substantial opposition. A rival coalition led by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) had opposed the retrenchment of public pension 
systems. Yet, despite global pensions policy traditionally being the domain of the ILO (Deacon, 
Hulse, & Stubbs, 1997; Orenstein, 2003; Holzmann 2012; 2013), it was unable to use its 
authority to stem the tide of successive countries ĂĚŽƉƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ tŽƌůĚ ĂŶŬ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ
pension model. In the years that followed the entry of the World Bank into the pension reform 
arena, the ILO found itself in a subordinate position in global pension debates. The global 
economic crisis in 2008 would mark a turning point in the prominence of the ILO. Its advocacy 
for national social protection floors found sympathetic ears in global governance circles. In a 
political and economic climate shaped by market volatility, the virtues of public expenditure 
on social protection, particularly as stabilizers in an economic downturn, were at the forefront 
ŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬĞƌƐ ?ŵŝŶĚƐ ?
 
In a marked contrast to the late 1990s, the World Bank and ILO now work much more closely 
on pensions and social protection policy. The World Bank has adopted the />K ?Ɛlanguage on 
national social protection floors and both organizations are working collaboratively to 
develop a new  ?Global Partnership for Universal Social Protection ? ?ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚ during the UN 
General Assembly week in September 2016 (ILO, 2016). Social protection floors have been 
recognized as part of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The first goal of ending poverty 
everywhere has its third target to:  “ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ
systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of 
ƚŚĞƉŽŽƌĂŶĚƚŚĞǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ? ?hŶŝƚĞĚEĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
The success of the ILO in re-asserting itself as a prominent actor in these debates was not 
solely down to an enabling external environment. In the years prior to the crisis, ƚŚĞ/>K ?Ɛ
social security department had been engaged in a protracted debate over its social protection 
stance. Eventually, the organization came to an agreed position, culminating in the 
ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů >ĂďŽur Committee (ILC) passing Recommendation 202 on 
National Social Protection Floors. From this moment onwards, the ILO has benefited from a 
unified and coherent approach to social protection, which enabled the organization to play a 
more dominant role in global debates.  
 
This paper focuses on internal policy debates of the World Bank and ILO to examine what role 
these have had in setting global pension policy. We focus on these two organizations because 
they are the only two that have dominated, at one time or another, global pension policy 
agendas  W the rise of PAYG pension systems worldwide in the case of the ILO and the rise of 
pension privatization in the case of the World Bank.  We demonstrate that a unified and 
coherent policy stance internally has enabled these international organizations to project 
global social policy agendas externally. We compare three different periods, one in which the 
World Bank was dominant, an interim period, and one in which the ILO renewed its influential 
position. In both instances where one organization was dominant, internal restructuring and 
the appointment of key personnel gave it the upper hand, while its rival organization was 
characterized by internal fragmentation and lack of a coherent message. In both cases, 
internal shifts predated major changes in the global pension policy. Yet internal debates 
within international organizations are often overlooked in debates on global social policy, 
despite the pioneering work of Bob Deacon and others in this area (Deacon 2001, 2007, 2013; 
Deacon & Stubbs 2007). Scholars more often have analyzed debates between international 
organizations than within them (Mesa-Lago 1996; Queisser 2000; Ervik 2005).  
 
International Organizations and Policy Ideas 
 
Global social policy has been portrayed as an arena in which international organizations and 
transnational actors compete to influence the welfare reform trajectories of national 
governments (Deacon, Hulse, & Stubbs, 1997); Charlton and McKinnon 2002; Fergusson and 
Yeates, 2014; Orenstein, 2008). Deacon ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶĂƐ “ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĂ ?ǁĂƌŽĨ
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚŽƐĞ ĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ĂŶĚactors within them who have argued for a more 
selective, residual role for the state with a larger role for private actors in health, social 
ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽƚĂŬĞƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞǀŝĞǁ ? ?ĞĂĐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? P
171). In their seminal work in the field, Deacon, Hulse, & Stubbs (1997) painted a picture of 
Central and Eastern Europe as a battleground, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and World Bank on one side arguing for a liberal approach to social policy, against the 
corporatist approach favored by the ILO and European Union (EU). Kaasch (2013) has 
challenged this approach to global social policy as an arena solely characterized by 
contestation. In the field of health policy, there is not one dominant model for international 
organizations to promote as a beacon for others to aspire to. In addition, international 
organizations are pressured to justify their own activities in the field. There are therefore 
better incentives for cooperation rather than competing for the exclusive right to shape 
policy. The policy environment portrayed in this paper demonstrates evidence of both conflict 
and cooperation within and between organizations.  
  
Similarly, global social policy scholars have drawn on contrasting traditions in international 
relations to explain how international organizations set their agendas.  Some argue, together 
with international relations realists, that international organizations are simply the agents of 
states (Hawkins, et al., 2006).  Within global social policy, a realist position often stresses the 
influence of the United States over the governance of the two Washington based 
international organizations, the World Bank and the IMF. It views these institutions as key 
advocates of an economically liberal direction (Wade, 2002). The ILO on the other hand, with 
its headquarters in Europe and its tripartite governance structure, is thought to be much 
closer to France and Germany.  
 
In contrast, constructivists have emphasized the autonomy of international organizations and 
their source of power as actors in their own right. Barnett and Finnemore (2004) have argued 
that international organizations have different sources of authority: delegated (from states), 
expert and moral. Whilst delegated authority reflects a realist world view, the latter two 
sources are associated with the constructivist perspective. International organizations may 
gain power and autonomy through expertise or moral suasion. Expertise may enable them to 
derive power through classifying the world, ordering information so that it is known and 
interpreted in a certain way. This power to construct reality can orient action from domestic 
policy makers.  Similarly, Dostal (2004) shows that international organizations may create and 
deploy  ?ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞs ?ƚŽ “ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŚĞŝƌŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚůǇ
and in a broad variety of contexts while convincing other institutions to adopt them 
ŝŶĐƌĞŵĞŶƚĂůůǇ ?  ? ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ? ?These discourses may be shaped shaped by ĂŶ ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
internal value system and cognitive frameworks.  
 
In a development of this constructivist position, Béland & Orenstein (2013) have argued that 
the characterization of international actors as being aligned on predictable political axes is 
problematic. Rather, they propose a model of international organizations as open systems, 
which respond and adapt to the external environment.  
 
This paper builds on this position by opening the black box on international organizations. It 
draws on 25 elite interviews conducted with past and present staff at the World Bank and ILO 
from late-2016 to mid-2018, alongside an analysis of key policy documents.2  It  focuses on 
internal political battles and debates within the two organizations over pensions and social 
protection policy. We describe how these organizations have responded to changes in the 
external environment and show that internal restructuring and personnel changes can have 
a substantial impact on international policy agendas. The assumption of fixed policy positions 
of the World Bank and ILO will be shown to be partially true, but also problematic. Personnel 
changes and the role restructuring can alter the stance of the entire organization in specific 
policy areas and make it more or less effective. Global social policy scholars therefore should 
ĨŽůůŽǁĞĂĐŽŶ ?Ɛ ůĞĂĚ ?Deacon, 2013) in paying closer attention to the internal dynamics of 
international organizations, as well as their ideological predispositions and other contextual 
factors.  
 
A constructivist position in relation to the power of international organizations, aligns itself 
with an ideational or discursive approach to policy and politics. A growing number of scholars 
have begun to focus on ideas as explanatory variables in the process of institutional 
development and change (Béland, 2005; Béland & Cox, 2011; Blyth, 2002; Hall, 1993; Hay, 
2008). These scholars have stressed that change is not driven (solely) by material conditions 
and fixed preferences, but rather by how actors interpret their material conditions. From a 
constructivist perspective, international organizations act as purveyors of policy ideas. 
Through their power of classification, they can influence how actors interpret their 
surroundings and what social problems and solutions make it onto the political agenda 
(Kingdon, 2014). Blyth (2002) argued that ideas act as blueprints for change under 
uncertainty. However, with a multitude of ideas on the menu of policy options, the reasoning 
behind which ideas are selected was left under-explored. If those with superior resources are 
able to push their ideas onto the agenda, then ideas become redundant as an explanatory 
variable, and material resources become the most important factor. The analysis in this paper 
shows that internal coherency and organization, alongside an enabling zeitgeist, can 
supersede resources. This does not negate resources as an important variable in explaining 
how some ideas gain prominence over others, but rather argues that resources are not the 
only factor. 
 
The External Policy Environment in the 1990s 
 
The end of the Cold War and post-socialist transitions influenced the global social policy 
environment in the 1990s. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe were undergoing the twin 
transformation from one-party authoritarianism to democracy, and from state socialism to 
market-based capitalism, accompanied by integration into the global economy.  The scale of 
this transformation had never been undertaken before and a desperate need for foreign 
capital made the region dependent on the expertise and funds of international financial 
institutions (Roaf et al., 2014). As a result, post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe were uniquely susceptible to neoliberal policy advice.  Countries in the region engaged 
ŝŶĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨ ?ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞsignaling ?ĨŽƌŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐĂƉŝƚĂů, in which they adopted radical 
neoliberal policies to signal to international investors they were friendly places to do business 
(Appel and Orenstein 2018).  
 
In contrast to the traditional client base of the World Bank, post-socialist Central and Eastern 
European countries had some of the highest pension spending in the world (World Bank, 
1994: 263). In addition, the region also had a high incidence of pensioner poverty due to a 
history of inadequate indexing of pension benefits (Müller, 1999). These systems required 
large employer contributions, which encouraged tax evasion and undermined the stability 
and robustness of the system. The region had a rapidly ageing population and a low 
retirement age. To add to the burden, during the early period of the transformation, the 
pensions system was used as de facto unemployment benefit to ease the impact of transition 
on older workers. Vanhuysse (2006) argues that the use of early retirement in Poland and 
disability pensions in Hungary were tools of protest avoidance. The sudden emergence of 
mass unemployment in both countries, as a result of entire sectors being made redundant in 
the transition to capitalism, ripened the conditions for social disorder (Piven and Cloward, 
1977). In effort to avoid this, policymakers encouraged early retirement.  This separated the 
interests of the senior members of the workforce, who were more likely to engage in 
industrial action, from younger members less embedded in trade union networks. As 
Vanhuysse (2006) shows, the level of strike activity was remarkably low, given the level of 
societal transformation being undertaken and its deep economic consequences. However, 
the result was a dramatic increase in pension expenditure.  
 
Organizing for Pensions Policy Impact in a Post-Socialist World 
 
The World Bank: 1994-2000 
 
The collapse of the communist system represented favorable conditions for the World Bank. 
It was a time when neoliberal policy prescriptions were at their zenith. Many Central and 
Eastern European governments were keen to signal their market-oriented fervor or 
willingness to go along with market reforms. CŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐĞŶŐĂŐĞĚŝŶĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨ ?competitive 
signalŝŶŐ ?ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĂƚƚƌĂĐƚneeded foreign investment and not be left behind. This signaling 
included enacting not only the Washington consensus policy reforms, but also what Appel 
and Orenstein (2018) have labeled  ?ĂǀĂŶƚ-ŐĂƌĚĞ ?ŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?dŚĞƐĞ are policies that 
are more neoliberal than those implemented across the developed world (e.g. flat tax systems 
and pension privatization), and intended to stimulate foreign investment. However, this 
enabling external environment was not enough to guarantee the success of the tŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ?Ɛ
influence on pension policy; it also required a well-organized internal structure and approach.  
 
The World Bank had to organize itself to respond to the needs of the transition economies in 
pension reform (interview with Robert Palacios, World Bank, January 2017). These new clients 
for the Bank had very different concerns and capacities compared to its traditional client base 
of developing countries. In the transition countries, the Bank found itself addressing the 
needs of industrial countries in Europe whose expenditure on pension provision was 
substantially higher than in the developing countries who traditionally used Bank assistance. 
For this reason, the Bank concluded it needed a formal document and position on pension 
policy. 
 
The publication of Averting ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĞĂŶŬ ?ƐĨŽƌŵĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞŶĞǁƉŽƐƚ-socialist 
landscape it found itself operating in.  Averting initiated significant internal debate (Singh 
1996; Müller 1999; Holzmann 2000; Brooks 2005; Weyland 2005; Orenstein 2008, 2013; 
Armeanu 2018). Averting was commissioned by the Chief Economist Larry Summers. Director 
of Research Nancy Birdsall appointed Estelle James, an academic economist, to lead the 
publication. The research was carried out under the supervision of Michael Bruno, Vice 
President of Development Economics, who signed the foreword at the beginning of the 
document. The Development Economics Vice Presidency came into conflict with work by Bank 
Staff and consultants in the ĂŶŬ ?ƐEastern Europe operations division, together with outside 
academics, who favored parametric reforms to the existing system (Deacon, Hulse, & Stubbs, 
1997). At the same time as the publication of Averting, a rival document with a more cautious 
approach to pension privatization was published from this division. It argued for parametric 
reforms to the pension system and a focus on poverty relief (Barr, 1994). An internal political 
battle ensued. However, the rival visions for Central and Eastern European pension systems 
did not have equal resources. Averting had a $250,000 marketing budget. The alternative 
proposals had no publicity budget. In addition, Averting drew support from the financial 
market and development sector of the Bank. It offered the promise of not only financial 
sustainability in the pension system, but also the chance to develop nascent capital markets 
in Central and Eastern Europe (Interview with Nicholas Barr, World Bank Consultant, 
December 2016).  
 
Soon after this internal battle, a unified and coherent message came out from the Bank. 
Averting is a document with a degree of different interpretations. Its core message is that in 
the context of ageing populations, public pension systems are not sustainable. It also argues 
that private pension provision has additional economic benefits. It therefore calls for a multi-
pillar pension system. For some, it simply stresses the advantages of risk diversification in a 
multi-pillar pensions system. For others, it advocates a Chilean style pension system across 
the globe. Those who drew this hard interpretation, such as Estelle James, were more likely 
to vehemently pursue reforms and were the most passionate in arguing for the benefits of a 
Chilean style reform. In the years that followed, Robert Holzmann was appointed as Director 
of the newly created Social Protection and Labor Department in 1997. The main bulk of 
pension reform technical advice and publications would now come from one department. In 
contrast to James, Holzmann was more pragmatic than ideological (interview with Emily 
Andrews, World Bank, August 2017). The Bank continued to support multi-pillar pension 
reform, whilst also acknowledging its drawbacks (Holzmann & Hinz, 2005).  
 
In sum, a coherent pension policy stance came from the Bank for a sustained period of time. 
The campaign for multi-pillar pension reforms won out internally due to the superior 
resources available to the team behind Averting, the institutional backing of other powerful 
elements of the Bank, like the financial markets personnel and the establishment of a 
supportive department active in pensions, the Social Protection and Labor Department. This 
internal consistency and coherency was necessary to enable the Bank to take its message to 
the rest of the world with a unified approach.  
 
The ILO: 1994-2000 
 
The ILO opened up a Budapest Office in 1992, specifically tasked to offer technical assistance 
and to influence the post-socialist transition process. However, on pensions, it found itself in 
an unaccommodating policy environment when the World Bank launched its campaign for 
pension privatization. Central and Eastern Europe represented an ideal-type for the World 
ĂŶŬ ?Ɛ ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ ŽĨƉƵblic pension systems. The ILO found itself trying to defend a pension 
system demonstrably failing, in a region with politicians unsympathetic to the public sector 
ĂŶĚĂƉƵďůŝĐƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽƵƐŽĨƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽŚŽŶŽƌƉĞŶƐŝŽŶƉƌŽŵŝƐĞƐ (Fultz, 
2012). 
 
The Social Security Department of the ILO had been deeply opposed to the message of 
Averting. However, its initial response to Averting was low-key, coming in the form of a 
journal article in collaboration with the ISSA (Beattie & McGillivray, 1995). Here the authors 
argued that replacing public pension systems with mandatory private savings placed an 
unacceptably high degree of risk on workers and pensioners. In addition, they argued it would 
make old-age pensions more expensive and that the transition would impose a substantial 
fiscal burden on current and future workers.  They proposed parametric reforms to old age 
pension systems, such as raising the retirement age or increasing the contribution rates, to 
keep systems in balance.  
 
However, the internal structure of the ILO precluded the development of a more significant 
alternative to Averting (Baccaro & Mele, 2012). The ILO has a tripartite governance structure 
of employer, trade union and country representatives. A formal position developed by the 
/>K ?Ɛ ďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂĐǇ (the International Labour Office), must have the support of all of these 
constituents. Whilst the Social Security Department vehemently opposed Averting, not all 
constituents did. In particular, some of ƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌƐ ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐsupported the idea of 
funded pension systems, partially as a result of lobbying from representatives of the FIAP - 
International Federation of Pension Funds Administrators (interview with Krzysztof 
Hagemejer, ILO, February 2018). The Latin American bloc of government representatives also 
tended to favor funded pensions, given their recent reform experience (interview with 
Emmanuel Reynaud, ILO, April 2018). When the ILO finally developed a response to Averting, 
it produced a document broadly in line with the message of Averting. Specifically, the ILO 
recognized a role for both defined benefit and defined contribution pensions, alongside a role 
for the private sector in pension provision (Gillion, 2000).  
 
The Campaign for National Social Protection Floors  
 
The next stage of global pension policy breakdown and the emergence of a new form of 
consensus was established over a long period of time. This section will outline the 
developments before the global economic crisis. For the ILO, it went from a fragmented 
position in the aftermath of Averting to a unified stance. In contrast, the tŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ?ƐƵŶŝĨŝĞĚ
and coherent position would break down as a result of continued internal debate. The onset 
of the global economic crisŝƐǁŽƵůĚůĞĂĚƚŽĂĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞďƌĞĂŬĚŽǁŶŽĨƚŚĞtŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ?ƐƚŚƌĞĞ-
pillar pension model, whilst initiating favorable conditions for the ILO. A brief outline of the 
global external environment will follow this section, before a final section on the internal 
politics and debates of both organizations.  
 
The ILO: 2000-2007 
 
Averting had damaged the confidence of the ILO in exerting influence in the global policy 
process in one of its key areas of social policy expertise. In the words of one of its branch 
directorƐĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞ ? “ƚŚĞ/>KŚĂĚůŽƐƚƚŚĞďĂƚƚůĞĂŶĚƐŽŶĞĞĚĞĚƚŽ find a new battlefield ? 
(interview with Emmanuel Reynaud, ILO, April 2018). It was partly for this reason that the ILO 
began to focus on extending the coverage of social protection (including pensions) in 
developing countries. It was also a functional response to a growing policy problem. The ILO 
had traditionally championed wage-related social security in the formal sector as the best 
way to develop a comprehensive social security system. It had envisaged the formal sector 
growing in parallel with economic development. However, this had not happened and there 
was substantial evidence of the informal sector continuing to grow. The ILO estimated that 
ŽŶůǇ  ? ?A? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ?Ɛ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ had adequate social protection (Reynaud, 2002). It 
therefore needed to develop a new policy to expand coverage to the informal sector. A 
campaign was initiated by the ILO as an attempt to place extending coverage onto the 
international agenda. The theme of its 2001 International Labour Conference was  “extending 
social security to all. ? dŚĞŵĂŝŶĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐĞƐƐŝŽŶǁĂƐ ?ŚŝŐŚĞƐƚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇƐŚŽƵůĚŐŽƚŽ
policies ĂŶĚŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐƚŽĞǆƚĞŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƚŽƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽŚĂǀĞŶŽŶĞ ? ?/>K ? ? ? ? ? Pǀ ? ? 
 
The new focus for the ILO in the area of social security developed at a time of internal 
disorganization. The Director General of the ILO, Juan Somavia, had undertaken a 
considerable reorganization of the ILO hierarchy. This entailed a flattening of the managerial 
structure. As a consequence, the Social Security Department lost its director when Colin 
Gillion retired. The two branches of the department (one dealing with social security policy 
design and standards, the other with social security financing and quantitative policy analysis) 
joined the new Social Protection Sector, one of four technical sectors of the International 
Labour Office. The new social protection sector also had a small team working on socio-
economic security. The two branches of the previous Social Security Department and the 
socioeconomic security project each effectively became their own silos, competing with 
separate visions for social security (as interpreted by Deacon, 2013). The more dominant unit 
was Social Security Policy and Development (SOC/POL). It was headed by Emmanuel Reynaud 
and was seeking to develop micro insurance as one of the ways to expand coverage (see 
Reynaud, 2006).  
 
Another unit was the Social Security, Financial, Actuarial and Statistical Services (SOC/FAS). It 
had more involvement in the field. Its team supported the development of social insurance 
schemes in developing countries by offering technical assistance. At the same time, it was 
searching for policy solutions to enable the extension of coverage beyond those in formal 
employment. The leader of this smaller branch, Michael Cichon and his team were much more 
involved than other units in criticizing the World Bank pension reform stance, using its 
economic, financial and actuarial knowledge capacity to challenge Bank models and 
assumptions. They were also skeptical about micro insurance. Cichon and his team were part 
of an emerging global coalition of actors who were seeking to promote the concept of a floor. 
It first entĞƌĞĚƚŚĞŐůŽďĂůĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞĂƐĂ ?global social fůŽŽƌ ?ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ/>K ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽ
debates on a social dimension of globalization (ILO, 2004). However, at this point it had no 
institutional support and remained one of several policy ideas in the primeval soup. The idea 
was kept alive by Cichon and a small group in international policy circles (Deacon, 2013). A 
smaller branch, headed by Guy Standing, the InFocus Program on Socioeconomic Security 
 ?/&W ?^^ ? ? ĐŚĂŵƉŝŽŶĞĚ Ă ŵŽƌĞ ƌĂĚŝĐĂů ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶĐŽŵĞ  ?DĂŝĞƌ-Rigaud, 2009). Therefore, 
despite having a unified objective of extending social security provision, substantial 
disagreement on the means to achieve it meant that stasis was a feature of ƚŚĞ/>K ?ƐƐŽĐŝĂů
policy stance (interview with Krzysztof Hagemejer, ILO, February 2018).  
 
This stasis lasted for around five years. In 2005 Juan Somavia reverted back to a structure 
similar to the one he had reformed. The two branches of the Social Security Department were 
once again subsumed into one department. Michael Cichon was appointed director and 
began to move the stance of the department in line with his vision for the extension of social 
security. Cichon came from the development tradition in the ILO. He framed social protection 
in the language of social rights (Cichon & Hagemejer, 2007). This represented a break from 
the tripartite heritage of the organization. A departure of this nature would inevitably be met 
with considerable opposition from within the department. For many in the department, a 
focus on minimum protection posed a threat to the adequacy of social insurance benefits and 
ceded too much ground to those, such as the World Bank, who advocated a residual, social 
safety net policy (Interview with Elaine Fultz, ILO, May 2017). Cichon would therefore have to 
convince his department, as well as the governments, trade unions, and employer 
associations that ultimately determine ILO policy, and then the world.  
 
Internally, Cichon was able to convince the department of the utility of social protection floors 
by framing them in the traditions of the ILO. He argued that the concept built upon two 
previous ILO Recommendations: No. 67 on universal income security and No. 69 on universal 
medical care. It was also an accompaniment to the ILO Convention 102 on minimum 
standards. In addition, the social protection floors strategy was to be two-pronged: a 
horizontal dimension focused on a universal minimum, and a vertical dimension, committed 
to extending social protection beyond a minimum in the traditional contributory way of the 
past (Deacon 2013).  
 
The campaign for social protection floors was both an internal one, within the ILO, and a wider 
global campaign. More detail on the internal campaign will be outlined in the next section on 
the ILO below. The external campaign began before the social floor was official ILO policy. In 
2007, Cichon convened a meeting with representatives from UNDESA (United Nations 
Department of Social and Economic Affairs), UNICEF  ?hŶŝƚĞĚEĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ&ƵŶĚ ?ĂŶĚ
Help Age International. The meeting formalized the Coalition for a Global Social Floor (2007). 
It sought to be a steering committee to bring together a movement for social protection floors 
under the UN umbrella. It was established in the context of debates around a fairer 
globalization and global inequalities. In addition, these debates were taking place in parallel 
with the positive experiences of modern forms of universal social policy in the global south, 
such as the conditional cash transfer programs being rolled out in Latin America (Huyse, et 
al., 2017). As it will be shown below, the campaign would be given further impetus in the 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŐůŽďĂů ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĐƌŝƐŝƐ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ />K ?Ɛ ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ĚĞďĂƚĞƐ Ɛubstantially 
enhanced and formalized. However, it is important ƚŽŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ/>K ?ƐƌĞŽƌŐĂŶŝǌation took 
place prior to the onset of the global financial crisis.   
 
The World Bank: 1999-2009 
 While the ILO was shifting to a new consensus on social protection, the World Bank was 
undergoing substantial internal debate on its promotion of a multi-pillar pension model. 
Opposition to Averting was first brought into the spotlight at the end of the 1990s with a 
provocative paper coauthored by its Chief Economist titled: Rethinking pension reform: Ten 
myths about social security systems (Orszag & Stiglitz, 1999). Here the authors attacked many 
of the assumptions of Averting, critiquing its microeconomic, macroeconomic and political 
economy assumptions. Whilst the paper proved controversial, it did not immediately affect 
policy change, not least because it had been undertaken without consulting the Social 
Protection and Labor Department (interview with Emily Andrews, World Bank, August 2017). 
More criticism from inside the Bank came in the form of a report in 2005 titled Keeping the 
Promise of Social Security in Latin America. The main criticism here was the disappointing 
coverage across the region. This assessment was not universally accepted within the Bank. 
Some were critical that the project did not consult industry or policy makers in the region 
(interview with Robert Holzmann, World Bank, December 2016). The report remains 
untranslated into Spanish.  
 
When Nick Stern became Chief Economist at the World Bank, he initiated an update to 
Averting. This new volume would be a joint cross-sectoral report by the World Bank to explain 
to the rest of its staff, and the world, its position on pensions (Holzmann & Hinz, 2005). Whilst 
it largely reasserted the case for a multi-pillar framework of public and private provision, as a 
way to diversify risk, it acknowledged that more needed to be done on poverty alleviation 
and coverage. The report was reviewed by five external experts, including prominent critics 
of Averting, Nicholas Barr and Peter Diamond. Whilst in Washington, DC to give feedback on 
the Holzmann and Hinz (2005) volume, Barr and Diamond agreed that it would be a good idea 
for the World Bank to conduct a formal evaluation of its pension work as a whole, in contrast 
with earlier evaluations which were on a project-by-project basis. Peter Diamond took this 
suggestion to Nick Stern and the idea for a formal evaluation was born (interview with 
Nicholas Barr, former World Bank Consultant, December 2016). The Independent Evaluation 
Group was led by Emily Andrews who was approaching mandatory retirement at the Bank. 
Her report argued that some of the benefits of multi-pillar reform had been oversold by the 
Bank. It called for greater attention to parametric pension reforms and echoed the findings 
on the Latin American report that of multi-pillar reform had been disappointing in its promise 
to extend coverage of pension provision. It argued that much greater attention needed to be 
paid to initial conditions before advocating multi-pillar reform (Independent Evaluation 
Group, 2006). Alongside a critique of multi-pillar pension systems, the World Bank was also 
beginning to shift its focus towards coverage. Holzmann and Hinz (2005) recognized this as 
an area where the Bank had more work to do. In 2009, this was expressed more explicitly in 
Closing the Coverage Gap, which focused on the role of non-contributory pensions and 
minimum pension guarantees (Holzmann, et al., 2009; Deacon 2013). 
 
The 2008 Global Economic Crisis 
 
As the ILO moved towards a policy consensus in the mid to late 2000s, and the World Bank 
drifted towards dissensus, the global economic crisis would crystalize these positions. At the 
onset of the downturn it represented a crisis of the global economic structure; justifying a 
large-scale intervention of the state in the management of the economy. In an effort to offset 
the impact of the downturn, governments around the world used an active fiscal policy to 
stimulate aggregate demand or to rescue insolvent banks. Much of this action was 
coordinated at the global level through the G20. It was also supported by the IMF (IMF, 2008). 
In addition, the role of social security was recast. The dominant message from the World Bank 
on the sustainability of pension systems, and the virtues of private provision, were drowned 
out in a context of market volatility and economic contraction. In the immediate crisis era, 
the role of social security as an automatic stabilizer in the economy was emphasized (IILS, 
2011). In light of this, the ILO found itself invited to the top table of global governance to 
report how social security could be deepened to embed its role as an automatic stabilizer in 
the global economy (Deacon, 2013).  
 
The role of international cooperation during the crisis would have a significant impact upon 
embedding the social protection floor in global policy discourse. The crisis prompted the UN 
to develop a series of coordinated responses to foster a recovery and better protect the 
ǁŽƌůĚ ?Ɛ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĚŽǁŶƚƵƌŶƐ (Deacon, 2013).  The UN Chief 
Executives Board (UNCEB) established the Social Protection Floor Initiative (SPF-I) to 
coordinate development efforts and improve its assistance to countries wishing to expand 
social protection. This was to be chaired by the ILO and World Health Organization (WHO). In 
effect, this meant that social protection floors went from being a campaign of disparate 
groups (mentioned above), to official UN policy. The SPF-I would have a significant impact in 
August 2010 by inviting the former President of Chile, Michelle Bachelet to chair an advisory 
group on social protection floors. The 2011 publication coincided with the French Presidency 
of the G20 and French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, was fortuitously sympathetic to the idea of 
a social protection floor (Deacon, 2013). The Bachelet Report called for more inter-agency 
collaboration on social protection. It argued that coordination was often lacking between 
ministries, UN agencies and IFIs. It advocated the establishment of a mechanism for 
collaboration and coordination of experts from all the relevant experts from UN agencies, 
program funds, regional commissions and IFIs (ILO, 2011).  
 
The recommendation from the Bachelet Report was acted upon when the G20 Development 
Working Group set up a Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board (SPIAC-B). It 
ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “tŽƌůĚĂŶŬĂŶĚ/>K ?ŝŶĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂ ŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŽƚŚĞƌƌĞůĞǀant international 
organizations, develop a mechanism to improve inter-ĂŐĞŶĐǇĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?' ? ?tW ? ? ? ? ?: 
paragraph 55). The mandate of the SPIAC-B is to complement existing collaborations, such as 
the SPF-I. It is chaired by the World Bank and ILO and meets bi-annually. The board is attended 
by all relevant international organizations, bilateral donors and relevant NGOs. The initial 
division of labor between the two global governance mechanisms was determined at the first 
meeting of the SPIAC-B. It concluded that SPF-I would focus its efforts on the horizontal 
dimension of social protection coverage, whilst the SPIAC-B would provide a broader and 
more inclusive mechanism for sharing information and coordination between partners, 
addressing the system as a whole, the vertical dimension ILO (SPIAC-B, 2012).  
 
The crisis therefore provided the momentum for the social protection floor campaign and 
formalized the role of the ILO in inter-agency boards. The ILO emerged from the crisis with an 
enhanced reputation and an enhanced role in global social protection policy. The crisis would 
also be an important backdrop in the passing of Recommendation 202 at the ILC in 2012. 
 
DĞĂŶǁŚŝůĞ ?ƚŚĞĞŶĂďůŝŶŐĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚŚĂĚďĞĐŽŵĞĂĚǀĞƌƐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞtŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ?ƐŵƵůƚŝ-pillar 
pension model. Farnsworth and Irving (2011) argue that the global economic crisis is not one, 
but a series of separate, interrelated crises (see also Starke, et al., 2013). Beginning with the 
credit crunch in 2007, the first crisis was one of financial markets starved of liquidity. This 
then led to a crisis in the real economy, as the growth rate for the world economy turned 
negative in 2009. The impact on pension funds was almost immediate as stock markets 
recorded huge losses. The OECD estimates $5 trillion dollars was wiped off pension assets 
during the crisis (Keeley & Love, 2010).  
 
The adverse effect on pension returns after the crisis exacerbated the already weak 
performing private pension pillars in Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, as Table 1 shows, 
in every country apart from Poland, Croatia and Romania, the pension contributions would 
have made a superior return in the first pillar than their investment in the second pillar, as 
economic growth rates were higher than market returns.  
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Next came a fiscal crisis, which threatened the stability of the Eurozone, as markets turned 
on the debt levels of Southern Europe. The state activism of the early crisis period was 
replaced by an era of austerity. Balanced budgets became an important signal of economic 
stability, rather than the enactment of avant-garde neoliberal reforms. A renewed emphasis 
on balancing budgets helped to make the case for overturning pension privatization. In 
privatized pension systems, a proportion of the contributions to the public pension system 
were diverted into individually funded accounts. However, the pensions of those already 
retired still needed to be paid. This created a shortfall in pension revenues needed to finance 
the payment of pensions that was financed by government debt. This borrowing cost as much 
as 1.9% of GDP each year (Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012). At the same time, accession to 
the European Union (EU) required abiding by Maastricht Criteria on the budget deficit and 
national debt, which stipulates that member states cannot run a budget deficit larger than 
3% of GDP or a national debt larger than 60% of GDP. Suspending, scaling down, or completely 
reversing the multi-pillar pension model to meet these requirements became a tempting 
option for all countries in the region.  
 
Suspending the multi-pillar model meant that contributions diverted into funded accounts 
could be temporarily redirected into the state coffers to ease a budgetary crisis. This option 
was undertaken by the Baltic states in the immediate crisis period (Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 
2012). Scaling down did the same thing, to a smaller degree, but on a permanent basis. 
Slovakia chose this option (ibid). Completely abandoning the multi-pillar system permanently 
diverted the contribution back into general tax revenues. It also gave the state access to the 
accumulated pension funds that had built up during the funded period. This option was 
undertaken by Kazakhstan, Hungary, and to a lesser extent, Poland (Naczyk & Domonkos, 
2016). Alongside the reform reversals in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin American countries 
such as Argentina and Bolivia renationalized their funded pension pillars (Naczyk & 
Domonkos, 2016). Table 2 summarises the pension reform reversals in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƚŚĂƚƐƵĐŚĂůĂƌŐĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƌĞǀĞƌƐĂůƐƚŽƚŚĞtŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ?ƐƉĞŶƐŝŽŶ
model sent to the global policy community, the World Bank had also lost its leverage in 
Central and Eastern Europe. In the early transition period, the Bank had used its lending 
capacity to influence finance ministers across the region (Müller, 1999; Appel & Orenstein, 
2018). However, as the region became more integrated into the global economy and the EU, 
it had other sources of finances. For example, as the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) became a much more important source of finance, this significantly 
diminished the influence of the Bank in the region (Interview with Jacek Rostowsky, Finance 
Minister of Poland 2007-2013, July 2017).  
 
As Starke, et al. note, overall the international cimate with regard to the role of social policy 
in mitigating the effect of financial crisis was consensual (2013: 133). The global economic 
crisis had the dual impact of propelling the ILO back to the forefront of policy making in social 
protection whilst at the same time creating the conditions for many countries to abandon 
their World Bank-inspired multi-pillar pension models. This was particularly true in Central 
and Eastern Europe, but also the case in Latin America where Argentina and Bolivia where 
the economic climate forced them into a pension renationalization. The reputation of the 
World Bank in pension expertise was damaged at the same time its influence in middle-
income countries was diminishing. Internal developments within both organizations had set 
the stage for these results in the years before the crisis.  
 
A new global consensus on social protection?  
 
The convergence of both organizations around the issue of coverage prior to the crisis opened 
up an opportunity for increased dialogue and cooperation in the years that followed. This was 
partially a consequence of the internal dynamics of both organizations. The World Bank would 
cease to vigorously campaign for multi-pillar pension reform. The ILO, on the other hand, 
ceased to solely champion wage-related social protection and developed a coherent policy 
stance with Recommendation 202 on National Social Protection Floors. This section outlines 
these developments and offers some concluding thoughts on the new era of collaboration 
between the two organizations.  
 
The World Bank from 2008 onwards 
 
In 2009, Robert Holzmann reached a mandatory service cap and was replaced as Director of 
the Social Protection and Labor Department. His successor, Arup Banerji, did not have a 
background in pensions, and so the momentum of a director focused on pensions ended. 
Under Banerji, the department took a broader focus on social protection. The Social 
Protection and Labor Strategy, published in 2012, outlined the role social protection can play 
in managing risk. It focused on three core principles: Resilience, Equity and Opportunity. It 
argued that social protection offers resilience against the new social risks, equity in reducing 
poverty and opportunity through human capital investment. Importantly, the strategy made 
extensive references to the ILO Social Protection Floor and spoke of an  ?emerging global 
consensus ? (World Bank, 2012: 14).  
 
The shifting away from pensions by the Social Protection and Labor Department came at a 
tumultuous time for the organization at large. In 2012, the World Bank formally elected Jim 
Yong Kim to serve as its president. Upon assuming office, Kim initiated a restructuring of the 
Bank that proved highly controversial. It was noted above, how the region of Central and 
ĂƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞŚĂĚďĞĐŽŵĞůĞƐƐĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŽŶƚŚĞĂŶŬ ?ƐĨŝŶĂŶĐĞ ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐĂůƐŽƚƌƵĞŽĨƚŚĞ
many of the world ?Ɛ emerging economies. In order to remain relevant, Kim sought to 
breakdown the regional silos that, he argued, discouraged the sharing of best practice 
(Lowrey, 2014). His reorganization consisted of abandoning the geographical structure of the 
Bank to replace it with global practices, with technical expertise in specific policy areas. It was 
ďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚŬĞĞƉƚŚĞĂŶŬ ?ƐůĞŶĚŝŶŐĐŚĂŶŶĞůƐĂůŝǀĞƚŽĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐŵĂƌŬĞƚƐĨŽƌƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ
projects, alongside lending to those locked out of international capital markets (Financial 
Times, 2014). The reorganization was conducted over two years and was unpopular with 
World Bank staff. Alongside concerns about losing the local expertise necessary for policy 
implementation, it coincided with a high turnover of senior departures. To illustrate the level 
of dissatisfaction, in an emergency town hall style meeting with the President, 8000 out of 
10,000 staff were present, including 5000 tuning in online from across the globe (Birdsall, 
2014).  
 
As a consequence of this controversial restructuring, the World Bank was inward looking at a 
time when one of its flagship pension schemes was being abandoned across the globe. In 
2008, the World Bank issued guidance on the crisis and funded pillars. At this point only 
Argentina had closed down its second pillar and the Bank was (correctly) fearful of more 
countries doing the same. It cautioned against dramatic systemic responses to short-term 
shocks (Dorfman, Hinz, & Robalino, 2008). However, this was when Holzmann was still the 
director. When countries did begin to carry out reform reversals in Central and Eastern 
Europe, no response came from the Social Protection and Labor Department and the Bank 
took no formal view on the developments. A somewhat informal response came from Mamta 
MurƚŚŝ ?ƚŚĞĂŶŬ ?ƐƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĨŽƌĞŶƚƌĂůƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨĂďůŽŐ
post (Murthi, 2014). Here she gave an overview of pension developments in the region and 
suggested why countries had opted to scale down or close their second pillars but stopped 
short of criticizing them. Another candid assessment came from outside the Bank by its 
former Social Protection and Labor Director. Writing in a personal capacity, his position paper 
acknowledged many of the challenges for multi-pillar pension reforms such as market 
volatility, exorbitant fees and the possibility of a new permanent low in returns on assets 
(Holzmann, 2012).   
 
In sum, as a result of personnel changes, internal disruption and an unaccommodating 
external ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ? ƚŚĞ tŽƌůĚ ĂŶŬ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŵƵůƚŝ-pillar pension reform broke 
down. In addition, the client base of the Bank was now primarily developing countries, where 
the establishment of social pensions or the so-called zero pillar was the priority. This 
sharpened the focus on coverage and systems development to administer non-contributory 
benefits.  
 
The ILO from 2008 onwards 
 
Once the Social Security Department had reached a unified position on social protection 
floors, it was able to move the campaign to the next stage. The campaign for social protection 
floors had three dimensions (interview with Krzysztof Hagemejer, ILO, February 2018). First, 
it needed to convince all interested parties about the affordability of a social protection floor 
for low income countries. Here the department developed sophisticated modelling exercises 
ƚŽ ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ĨůŽŽƌƐ ǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚ ŽƵƚ ŽĨ ƌĞĂĐŚ ĨŽƌ ĞǀĞŶ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ?Ɛ
poorest countries (Pal, et al., 2005).  
 
The next stage in the campaign was to convince the rest of the ILO of the importance of social 
protection. The social protection department is much smaller than other ILO departments 
and does not carry the same authority as employment and labor rights (Huyse, et al., 2017). 
Cichon was able to raise the status of social protection by aligning his agenda with the wider 
Decent Work agenda promoted by the Director-General Juan Somavia. The Decent Work 
Agenda has four pillars: full and productive employment, rights at work, social protection and 
the promotion of social dialogue (ILO, 2012: 9). Cichon campaigned to give social protection 
the equal weight as the other four pillars.  
 
Finally, the task was to convince the constituents of the ILO in order to adopt a 
recommendation at the ILC in 2012. Cichon demonstrated pragmatism in this process. He 
abandoned the campaign for a singular concept of a social protection floor, to the plural 
concept of national social protection floors. The concept of a social protection floor was also 
refined from a set of benefits to a set of guarantees that could be delivered in a variety of 
ways (Deacon, 2013). This diluted the concept as it allows national governments to interpret 
minimum standards. However, it shielded the ILO from criticism from the global south that it 
was a tool of the global north to impose protectionist standards. In the event, these tradeoffs 
resulted in the ILO Recommendation 202 being unanimously adopted by the ILC in 2012. The 
ILO had a unified position on social protection, which had been endorsed internationally all 
ŽĨƚŚĞ/>K ?ƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐ.  
 
Shortly after the passing of Recommendation 202, Cichon retired as Director of Social 
Security. However, unlike in the instance of the World Bank where retirement stalled the 
policy development, his replacement, Isabel Ortiz was something of a continuity candidate 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ/>K ?ƐƐƚĂŶĐĞŽŶƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶĨůŽŽƌƐ ?/Ŷ ŚĞƌƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐƌŽůĞƐĂƚhE^ĂŶĚhE/&, 
she had been part of the Coalition for a Global Social Floor. The Department of Social Security 
was renamed the Department for Social Protection (SOCPRO) to bring its name in line with 
the terminology used in global policy documents. In addition, the department shifted focus 
slightly from technical assistance to global advocacy. This was done by reorienting existing 
capacity away from highly specialized technical positions to a larger number of junior profiles 
to support global advocacy campaigns (Huyse, et al., 2017).  
 
The outcome of the increased resources dedicated to global advocacy has been effective for 
the ILO. It was successful in its efforts to influence the UN Sustainable Development Agenda. 
This agenda will largely determine the orientation of development-related resources both 
globally and nationally. After lobbying from the ILO, social protection was integrated into five 
of the seventeen sustainable development goals.  This means that social protection is now a 
key focus of the development agenda for many years to come. Notably, goal 1.3 explicitly 
mentions social protection floors. As a response, the ILO, in collaboration with the World 
Bank, launched the Global Partnership for Universal Social Protection. This will be one of the 
main mechanisms for delivering the Sustainable Development Goals on social protection, 
with the ILO as a lead actor. It brings together a large number of international organizations 
and development partners, presenting itself as a follow up to earlier global universalism 
initiatives on universal education and universal health coverage.  
 
A new partnership or old rivalries? 
 
The Global Partnership is symbolic of the development of the relationship between the ILO 
and World Bank. At one time the two organizations were in heated opposition in their visions 
for pension policy. The evolution of positions in both organizations has paved the way for a 
much more collaborative relationship over the past decade. However, whilst both 
organizations use similar discourse on universal social protection and social protection floors, 
differences remain. A key difference is the interpretation of  “universal. ? For the World Bank, 
universal means everyone having some form of coverage, for the ILO it means everyone 
having the same coverage. This brings the role of means testing into sharp focus. In a recent 
report, the World Bank argued that means testing was more effective at reducing poverty in 
old age social pensions (World Bank, 2018: 83). For now, the rolling out of coverage to those 
who have none fosters close collaboration between the two organizations, since both are 
primarily focused on creating coverage. However, these differences in interpretation and 
orientation may have implications in for activities in the field and the technical advice given, 
particularly in the years to come as the vertical dimension of social protection takes 
precedent.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The internal dynamics of international organizations can be instrumental in setting global 
policy agendas. At critical moments in global political economy, actors within the World Bank 
and ILO were instrumental in shaping debates and orienting action. When ideas align with the 
prevailing paradigm, a coherent, organized message can supersede rival ideas. This analysis 
has shown how the World Bank gained superiority in global pension debates during the 1990s. 
These ideas aligned with the dominance of neoliberal ideas across the globe. However, they 
were also dependent upon an organized internal campaign within the Bank and an 
ĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŶŐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ?dŚĞ/>K ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐĨƌŽǌĞŶŽƵƚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞtŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ?Ɛ
campaign for pension privatization, realigned its priorities and organized for impact with the 
restructuring of its Social Security Department. The global economic crisis gave the social 
protection floor the impetus it needed both within and outside of the ILO. However, this 
would not have been possible without the promotion and ascendancy of Michael Cichon and 
his team, who prepared the ground for the idea to take off. As Deacon argued in his final 
work, the biographies of actors can be instrumental in the global social policy process 
(Deacon, 2013). This paper has developed this argument through the framework of an 
interaction between features of the external environment and the internal dynamics of 
international organizations.  
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1 While many other organizations were involved, including the OECD, European Union, and 
USAID, the World Bank dedicated greater resources to policy research, research 
dissemination, and policy planning, seeking to establish a global agenda for reform.  During 
this period, it supplanted the ILO, which had played a key role in establishing PAYG pension 
systems worldwide, as the top global agenda-setter for pension reform. 
2 The documents analysis focused on the official documents of each organization that 
included a substantive pension element. This included reports (both annual and thematic), 
technical documents for policy makers, resolutions, working papers and formal 
recommendations and conventions. 
                                                     
